October 4th, 2022
By Jack Masliah
In August of this year, tensions between China and Taiwan threatened to boil over as US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the East-Asian island. In response to Pelosi’s visit, China set forth a variety of political, economic, and military actions. Politically, China publicly condemned “US intervention into China’s territory” and pushed its allies to restate their commitment to the One-China policy. Economically, China banned the export of a variety of agricultural products into Taiwan (although this was largely a symbolic move as these exports account for a tiny percentage of Taiwan’s overall imports). Militarily, China announced a number of unprecedented training exercises throughout the Taiwan Strait. The scale of these exercises shocked many in the West, but it should not have, as it is clear that China is gearing up to violently reunify with Taiwan. So, how does China’s response to Pelosi’s visit serve their interests? And why does China have an ax to grind with Taiwan?
Although this is not the first time that a US Speaker of the House has visited Taiwan, China used this opportunity to reassert its ownership of Taiwan, change the current status quo, and flex its military muscles. Before Pelosi had even arrived in Taiwan, China attempted to discourage her from making the trip; Chinese media outlets touted the strength of their military, and even championed actions such as shooting down Pelosi’s plane if she decided to go through with the trip. In fear of major Chinese retaliation, the US navy deployed multiple warships into the seas East of Taiwan.
Apart from officially condemning the visit, calling it “a malicious provocation” and “a threat to Chinese sovereignty,” the PLA (the Chinese army) began by testing Taiwan’s defenses. This marked the first time ever that PLA unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were sent over Taiwan’s airspace. Over the coming days, the PLA mobilized equipment and troops throughout China’s Eastern provinces as a show of force. Tanks and personnel were spotted moving in the direction of the Chinese coast by ordinary citizens (implying that the PLA wanted these movements to be seen). There was also an announcement that China would conduct military drills in the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and around Taiwanese waters as soon as Pelosi’s plane departed. This culminated in a massive display of Chinese naval and aerial military power that included dozens of ships and over 70 aircraft. The number of times that PLA aircraft breached Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which is an area designated by Taiwan and not recognized by China, reached its highest recorded number. At the same time, the PLA launched multiple ballistic missiles around Taiwan (including a few which flew over the island), as well as crossed over the Median Line dozens of times (a line which is normally not crossed and serves to differentiate between both countries).
Days later, the Chinese government released a White Paper on Taiwan to reaffirm its “One-country, two systems” way of approaching the Taiwan issue. The new White Paper on Taiwan (another one was written almost 21 years earlier) included language that is more aggressive than previously seen, as it clarified that if Taiwan failed to reunify with mainland China peacefully, the PLA would have no choice but to achieve this goal by force. China also imposed sanctions on a variety of Taiwanese goods as well as on Chinese agricultural exports. Many of these sanctions did not carry any real weight, as the specific goods that China targeted—such as exports of natural sand and different types of fish—had a minimal effect on Taiwan’s economy. In terms of sanctions, due to the fact that China opted for a largely performative approach as opposed to one that could seriously hurt Taiwan’s economy, it signals that China is not yet ready to sacrifice its own economic ties with Taiwan in exchange for increasing reunification pressure.
The high level of coordination and planning that went into these exercises, as well as the incredibly detailed nature of the sanctions imposed, showed that China had been waiting for an excuse to conduct a show of force maneuver. This crisis also allowed China to alter the existing status-quo, all but erasing the Median Line and setting the precedent that any other high-level visits will be met with a military response. The exercises themselves made it clear that China is not only a military force to be reckoned with, but a force that seems intent on proving this capability. It is conceivable that China will now regularly conduct these large-scale exercises as to diminish their “shock-factor” (much like their constant incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ). Creating this new status quo means that China is likely to follow in Russia’s footsteps as they approach a military incursion into Taiwan—that of building up troops along the coast as to “conduct exercises” that eventually turn around and move on Taiwan.
The CCP’s (Chinese Communist Party’s) desire to reunify with Taiwan dates back to 1949. After the Communist Party defeated the Nationalists, they fled to Taiwan and established it as a new Chinese state. Ever since, the CCP drew a red line in the sand; it would not establish any relations with countries who officially recognized Taiwan as independent. As of today, only 14 countries officially recognize the PRC, while every other country has some form of commitment to the “One-China policy” which states that there is only one China.
At the time when the Nationalists established their own republic in Taiwan, a phrase began to circle around mainland China describing the failures and embarrassments of the last hundred years. This term was coined The Century of Humiliation, which encompasses a period of great loss from 1839 to 1949. During this time, China was defeated in the First and Second Opium Wars, was handed the Boxer Protocol which is seen as one of the most unfair treaties in history, and was invaded by both Japan and Russia many times over. A central tenet of the CCP and its leaders is to avenge the past, wipe this Century from the history books, and become a great power before 2049 (exactly 100 years after the end of The Century of Humiliation). In 2013, when Xi Jinping became China’s leader, he began speaking of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and the need to reunify with Taiwan by whatever means necessary. This ideology of rejuvenation is deeply enshrined within the CCP’s doctrine, as it takes the form of official policies and is seen as the crown jewel of Xi’s Great Rejuvenation.
Aside from ideological reasons, China’s desire to reunify with Taiwan also has a simpler explanation: cold, hard geo-political power. It is no secret that being powerful on the world stage has its share of advantages; the US’s international reach means that it acts as the de-facto leader of the liberal world, France and Germany guide the European pact, and Saudi Arabia (as well as Iran) have massive influence over the Middle East. China has been a major world power for years now as the country with the largest population and second-largest GDP, yet it has not achieved the same position of power that the US has upon the world stage.
Moving on Taiwan would cement China’s hegemony in a region that is expected to shape the following century. You have to look no further than 1000 kilometers South of Taiwan, towards the South China Sea, to prove this point. For years, China has attempted to increase their influence over this critical economic area—which accounts for over 30% of global trade—by creating artificial islands and using their maritime militias to harass local fishermen. Their recent military drills around Taiwan follows the same playbook that they use in the South China sea; to slowly do away with the status-quo and create a new normal that sees China asserting its influence over the area.
Taiwan would also give China the ability to project power into the Pacific as it would break free from the First Island Chain. Established after WWII, this chain of islands connects multiple naval bases stretching from Japan to Vietnam which allows the US to contain China’s sphere of influence. In case of some kind of confrontation, the US and its allies can block China’s maritime access to the rest of the world. Taiwan is seen as the midpoint of this chain, and has been hailed as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier,” but if it were to fall into the hands of the CCP, the strategy of containment that has been central to US policy in Asia for over 70 years would crumble.
Perhaps the biggest reason as to why China is increasingly looking to take Taiwan by force and abandoning its attempt to reunify through peaceful measures is due to one man: Xi Jinping. To outsiders, China’s government is seen as an all-encompassing agency that acts completely practically and rationally. This belief has been used as the main explanation as to why China’s economy and prominence has risen so sharply over the last decades, but it does not paint a full picture of what is happening within the CCP. Instead of a Goliath that always seems to find the most reasonable solution to its issues, the CCP is increasingly becoming a One Man Show. Much like Vladimir Putin’s uncontested reign over all aspects of Russia (from dictating the actions that oligarchs and therefore business can take to his intimate involvement in every aspect of his invasion of Ukraine) Xi continues inserting himself into all facets of Chinese society. Not since Mao Zedong had a cult of personality become the defining political structure of the CCP. Xi has used his power to crush his political opponents, pursue an unprecedented third term as President (which was made possible with an amendment to the constitution in 2017), and is likely to see his power increase after the 20th National Party Congress in October.
The danger associated with the consolidation of power by one individual is compounded by the fact that Xi is not as practical and competent as we all have been tricked to believe. China’s economy may be at the onset of its first recession in over 30 years, his treasured Belt and Road Initiative is facing resistance from the project’s members, and his commitment to a “zero Covid” policy is creating civil unrest and causing private companies to exit Chinese markets at an unprecedented rate. Cai Xia, a former professor at the CCP’s Central Party School, wrote a scathing article on the outright incompetence of Xi. Unlike the belief of many in the West that Xi rose to power through a combination of ruthlessness and pragmatism, she compares Xi’s rise to that of a nepotism baby’s; in which he used his fathers high-level placement within the CCP to kickstart his political career.
Applied to the Taiwan issue, while it is true that the Chinese political elites believe that reunification is essential to the rejuvenation of the Chinese state, many of them might believe that a full-on invasion of the island within the next decade (the window in which Xi is likely to stay in power) is not the most practical approach towards achieving this goal. Yet, because Xi has chosen to stake his career on the idea of The Great Chinese Rejuvenation, reunification with Taiwan has given the Chinese people a way to binarily measure Xi’s policy successes; he either achieves his goal of reunification or doesn’t.
The collective West has to wakeup to the reality that China will not be deterred from taking Taiwan due to the devastating effect that an invasion would have upon its economy, nor should the West believe that the reasons for taking Taiwan are based on some ultra-rational reason.